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Abstract
Many Agro-environmental practices, such as reduced fertilizer use or establishment of green set-asides, which are incentivised by policy 
instruments, may have simultaneous positive effects on multiple environmental goods. These environmental co-benefits increase the social desirability 
of a given policy instrument. In this paper we focus on water quality and GHG emissions and examine how climate and water quality policy instruments 
affect both their primary target emission and co-benefit emissions. We trace out especially the relative role of land use versus input use in emissions 
reduction. To facilitate this comparison, we define the socially optimal policy instruments when environmental co-benefits are either accounted for or 
omitted. 
Simulations for the Finnish agriculture show that if only water quality damage is internalised then the divergence from social optimum where both 
damages are internalised is not very large, while if only GHG emissions damage is internalised then the difference to the social optimum internalising 
both externalities is much larger. The optimal fertilizer tax rate is uniform (19%) when GHG emission damages are internalised but is differentiated 
when water quality damage or both externalities are internalised. The optimal fertilizer taxes vary from 19% to 58% and depend on soil type, soil 
quality and tillage method. Optimal tax on soil emissions vary from €15/ha in clay soils to €231/ha in organic soils. 
The analysis further demonstrates that land use has stronger effect on reducing water quality and GHG emission damages than changes in input 
use and thus extensive margin impact dominates intensive margin impact. Finally, policy-related transactions costs (PRTCs) affect the net tax revenue 
ranking of policy scenarios. Policy scenario focusing on water quality results in the highest net tax revenues, but consideration of PRTCs can change the 
net tax revenue ranking of policies as policies targeting water quality have relatively strong reduction in the net tax revenue due to the requirement to 
implement differentiated fertilizer tax that entails relatively high PRTCs.
Keywords: Greenhouse gas emissions;Carbon sequestration;Carbon taxes and subsidies
Introduction
The use of productive inputs and allocation of arable land 
determine not only how much food and feed is produced but they 
also determine the many ways agriculture impacts the environment. 
As often recognized, a change in any policy instrument targeting 
either production or a given agricultural public good or externality 
actually changes a large variety of environmental impacts 
Lichtenberg [1]. Recent notions of co-benefits or ancillary benefits 
refer to the side-effects of an instrument or a policy initiative. In 
general, the presence of co-benefits increase the social desirability 
of a given policy instrument. 
Despite the role given to environmental co-benefits, they have 
not received detailed attention in the literature. It would, however, 
be very helpful to understand which production factors promote 
best the multiple environmental benefits and what policy package 
or single policy instrument would be most efficient to bring them 
 
out. Considering, for example, nutrient runoff or GHG emissions 
from crop production, it is well known that reducing nitrogen 
fertilizer use decreases nitrogen runoff to waterways - but quite 
moderately. In contrast, land allocation between crops that differ 
with respect to nitrogen application intensity may often have much 
greater role see Lankoski et al. [2], not to mention land allocation to 
green set-aside or afforestation. 
In the similar vein, GHG emissions from cultivation practices 
and soil are almost constant under any policy and only reducing 
fertilizer use would decrease emissions in working lands [3]. 
Here, land allocation between crops is less helpful, while choice of 
cultivation method (tillage method) or land allocation to green set-
aside crucially reinforce reduction of emissions. So, the productive 
inputs play different role under alternative environmental policies. 
Especially, the climate policy aspects have become more and more 
important, due to Paris climate agreement and France’s initiative 
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to increase carbons sequestration in agricultural soils annually by 
4‰.
What argued above provides the starting point of this paper. 
It is our hypothesis that, by and large, changes in land allocation 
will provide the largest environmental co-benefits for key agri-
environmental policies. We focus on water quality and GHG 
emissions and examine how climate and water quality policy 
instruments affect GHG emissions and nutrient runoff. We trace 
out especially the relative role of land allocation and compare it 
to changes of productive inputs, such as nitrogen fertilizer, and 
choice of tillage method. To facilitate this comparison, we define 
the socially optimal policy instruments when co-benefits are 
either accounted for or entirely omitted. Farmers’ responses to 
these policy instruments determine the resulting input use, tillage 
method choice and land allocation. We then estimate the relative 
impacts of each measure numerically using data from the Finnish 
agriculture.
We choose climate change mitigation and water quality policies 
as our cases, because they entail changes both in productive inputs, 
tillage method and land allocation, while for instance biodiversity 
conservation would rely mostly on changes in land allocation. 
Furthermore, save bio energy policy, water and climate policy issues 
have been analysed separately this far Lankoski&Ollikainen[4]. 
A joint analysis is needed to examine the role of co-benefits. As a 
sector agriculture contributes substantially to climate change, with 
5.0-5.8 GtCO2eq of direct emissions per year during 2000-2010, 
representing 10-12% of global anthropogenic GHGs. Also, during 
the same time period a further 4.3-5.5 GtCO2eq of emissions was 
released from land use and land use changes Smith et al. [5], much 
of which was caused by agriculture. The main direct agricultural 
GHG emissions are nitrous oxide emissions from soils, fertilisers, 
manure and urine from grazing animals; and methane production 
from ruminant animals and paddy rice cultivation. Both of these 
gases have a significantly higher global warming potential than 
carbon dioxide. Nitrous oxide and methane emissions from 
agriculture covered more than 56% of the total anthropogenic N2O 
and CH4 emissions in 2005 Smith et al. [5]. Many studies show that 
agriculture has significant potential to reduce GHG emissions and, 
furthermore, it has a large potential to contribute to soil carbon 
sequestration [5-7]. 
For rainfed agriculture prone to nutrient runoff and leaching, 
water quality policies are especially important. In many areas, 
such as in the Baltic Sea or Chesapeake Bay, agriculture is the main 
source of nutrient pollution. Agricultural field parcels represent 
nonpoint sources of pollution and consequently create special 
challenges to water policies see Braden &Segerson[8] for an 
illustrative analysis). The seminal work by Griffin & Bromley [9,10] 
laid a basis for current policy approach. They showed that levying 
policy instruments directly on deterministic or stochastic nutrient 
runoff from field parcels is infeasible, and thus outlined the second-
best policies targeting those productive inputs that affect nutrient 
runoff. 
A lot of work has been done since thene.g. [11-13]. Existing 
measures include for instance reducing fertilizer application, 
establishing green set-asides, or improving manure application 
methods, and policy instruments such as taxes, fertilizer and 
manure application standards and constraints, water quality 
trading and agri-environmental payments. For our purposes, it 
is useful to note that the role of land productivity and its role in 
environmental policy design have been examined by [1,12,13].
While water quality policies are quite well characterized, 
literature on GHG mitigation policy for agriculture is relatively 
sparse. Some recent studies discuss the role of agriculture from 
the viewpoint of soil carbon sequestration and outline policies 
to promote sequestration, for example, through afforestation 
or conversion of arable land to grasslands[14]. Provide an early 
analysis, followed by [15-17] among others. [18-21] discuss the 
relative merits of taxes and emissions trading system for agriculture. 
[20,21] argue that a tax system, on which much experience has 
been accumulated, would be administratively simpler and in 
practice more effective than emission trading. [22,23] focus on GHG 
emissions trading and examine the role of agriculture. 
In this paper we derive analytically the key features of climate 
and water policies in the absence and presence of environmental 
co-benefits, when choices of input use intensity, tillage method and 
land allocation are taken into account. We also give a role to spatial 
heterogeneity regarding land quality and build the analysis in the 
heterogeneous land quality model to facilitate land allocation; here 
we rely on [1,12,13]. Our model includes the following features. 
First, the sources of GHG emissions are fertilizer application 
and other production inputs and soil emissions associated with 
alternative tillage methods (conventional and no-till). Second, 
soil textural classes matter for soil emissions and we distinguish 
between clay, loam and organic soils. Third, we introduce long term 
green set-asides as an additional means to sequester carbon and 
reduce nutrient runoff and, fourth, we endogenize the entry and 
exit of land between agriculture and forestry by allowing for the 
possibility of afforesting arable land.
The Socially Optimal Design of Agricultural Water 
Quality and GHG Mitigation Policy
We incorporate the science-based understanding of GHG 
emission fluxes and nutrient runoff from cultivation in a theoretical 
model based on heterogeneous land quality. In the model a farmer 
chooses inputs, tillage method and allocation of land between 
alternative land-use forms. 
The set-up: crop production and land use under 
heterogeneous land quality
Consider agricultural production when the total amount of 
arable land is A. The land is divided into field parcels, production 
units. The land quality in each parcel is uniform but land quality 
differs between parcels. The quality depends on physical, chemical 
and biological factors, such as soil textural class, organic content, 
and soil acidity. We assume that the land quality can be ranked 
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according to a scalar measure q, which varies between zero 
and one, 0 1q≤ ≤   (zero is the lowest and one is the highest land 
quality). The cumulative distribution of q can be written as ( )A q  
and the density is ( )qδ  , which is assumed to be continuous and 





A q dqδ= ∫     (1)
We assume that each parcel is allocated to a representative crop 
that can be cultivated using either no-till or conventional tillage. 
Crop production depends on the soil quality q, fertilizer use li, and 
tillage method i, as follows:
( );i i iy f l q= , i = 1, 2.   (2)
In equation (2), if indicates the yields under the two 
technologies (in what follows, i = 1 refers to conventional tillage 












> > ∂ ∂ 
. Difference in yields makes the technology choice 
relevant. The cultivation costs, such as fuel and labour, of no-till are 
smaller than those of conventional tillage but no- till may result in 
lower yields [24].
The private profits per parcel under tillage method i is defined 
by 
( );i i i i ipf l q cl Kπ = − − ,   (3)
Wherep refers to the price of crop and c is the price of fertilizer 
input1. Per parcel fixed costs iK  differ between technologies and 
consist of labour, fuel, seed, and capital costs. 
Society cares about the climate and other environmental 
impacts of crop production. Agricultural GHG emissions (expressed 
as CO2 equivalents) come from four sources:manufacturing 
and transporting of fertilizers, cultivation practices (ploughing, 
harrowing, planting, pesticide application, harvest, etc.), grain drying 
and finally, emissions from soil. Emissions from manufacturing 
and transporting fertilizers miE , are linear in fertilizer application
m
i iE lε= ,and independent of cultivation technologies. Emissions 
from cultivation practices fiE , are constant per hectare and 
depend on the chosen cultivation technology (for instance, no-till 
entail less tractor work and thus fuel use). 
Emissions from soil, denoted by siE  depend partly on the 
chosen tillage method and amount of fertilizer application. The 
former emerge from decomposing organic material (CO2emissions) 
and the latter from nitrification and denitrification caused by soil 
bacteria (N2O emissions). Thus, soil emissions as the sum of the two 
components are,
  ( )si i i iE a e l= +  (4)
where ia  refers to technology specific soil emissions and ( )i ie l
denotes N2O emissions from soils due to nitrogen fertilizer use (the 
first and second derivatives are positive).
We express the total emissions as m f si i i iE E E E= + + . Let 
( ) iG E  denote the social damages from climate emissions. 
In each field parcel of quality q nutrient runoff depends on the 
use of fertilizer and exogenous variables such as soil type (denoted 
by θ) as follows:
( ), ,i iz g l q θ= with 0lg > and 0llg >   (5)
Thus, nutrient runoff strictly increases with fertilizer 
application. Nutrient runoff damage is denoted by a convex damage 
function .Then, for each field parcel, the social returns 
to the crop production can be expressed as a function of the net 
revenue from crop production and climate and water quality 
damage as follows:
( ) ( ) ( )( );
ai
i i i i iW pf l q cl K G i D g l= − − − −

.      (6)
It is not necessary that all current arable land is devoted to 
cultivation under climate mitigation or water quality policy. We 
assume that a part of arable land may be allocated to sequester 
carbon or reduce nutrient runoff through establishment of green 
set-asides or some field parcels may even be afforested.When a 
given field parcel is allocated to long-term green set-aside, the 
depleted carbon content of soil starts gradually increase via 
sequestration. This process is finite in terms of both quantity and 
time of soil carbon sequestration. 
We use the annualized average value of sequestered carbon per 
year and denote by b . We denote the marginal benefits from carbon 
sequestration that is from emissions abated by G’(b) > 0 and green 
set-aside maintenance and establishmentcosts by Gc .For forestry 
we focus on carbon sequestration of afforested land over one 
rotation period and denote the amount by k, so that the marginal 
climate benefits are G’(k) > 0, the present annualized value of 
harvested timber is F and establishment costs R. Finally, (constant) 
runoff from green set-aside is denoted by Gz . In afforested lands 
nutrient runoff reduces to the level of natural background runoff. As 
neither of these land uses is fertilized, nutrient runoff is constant. 
Social net returns to these land-use forms can be given as,
( ) ( )GR G GW G b b c D z−′= −
  
(7)
( )'W G k k F R= + −   (8)
All parts of the policy model are now established. The challenge 
of the social planner is to design a policy that implements the social 
optimum.
1In Finland farmers need also to dry the grain; this is a special feature of northern rainfed countries, such as Scandinavian countries. We skip this in the 
theoretical analysis, because it would only work as a reduction of effective output price. We account grain drying in the empirical application.
Mod Concep Dev Agrono
                   
  Copyright © Markku Ollikainen
4/17How to cite this article: Markku O . Climate and Water Quality Policy Design for Agriculture with Environmental Co-Benefits. Mod Concep Dev Agrono.3(1). 
MCDA.000552. 2018. DOI: 10.31031/MCDA.2018.03.000552
Volume 3 - Issue - 1
Optimal policy design
The economic problem of the social planner is to choose the 
use of inputs, tillage method and land allocation so as to maximize 
the social welfare from agriculture when either GHG emissions or 
nutrient runoff or both are considered. The social welfare function 





ai GR FW W L W L W L q dqδ = + + ∫       (9)
Subject to 1 2 3 1L L L+ + = , that this, the shares of land uses 
should equal unity.
The first-order conditions governing the interior solution of the 
social optimum, where all land is allocated between the three uses, 
can be expressed as,
( ) ( )* ' . 0i ii i i
i
f gp l c G E E D l
∂ ∂− ′− − =∂ ∂      (10a)
( )*, ; 0
ai
GR
i iW l a q W− =
    
(10b)
                      
(10c)0GR FW W− =
Equation (10a) determines the fertilizer intensity per parcel as 
a function of land quality, market parameters and external effects. 
Equations (10b) and (10c) determine the critical land qualities 
governing land allocation between the cultivated area, green 
set-aside and afforestation. The solution depends also on tillage 
method: for each field parcel that tillage method is chosen which 
produces highest social returns. Finally, note that tillage method 
related soil emissions are present in net returns to cultivation and 
carbon sequestered in green set-aside and afforestation.
Farmer’s private solution can easily be extracted from the 
first-order conditions (10a)-(10c) by setting all external effects 
equal to zero. Thus, the choice of fertilizer use would reduce to
0i i
f l c∂ − =∂ and tillage method choice would be based on the highest private profits and no land would be allocated to green 
set-aside and afforestation. We examine first climate change and 
water quality policies separately. In Appendix we demonstrate 
that to implement the social optimum defined by equations 
(10a-10c), the government should impose price on carbon from all 
relevant sources, namely tax on emissions from fertilizer use and 
soil. Furthermore, a subsidy on green set-aside and afforestation 
is needed to incentivise carbon sequestration, as suggested by 
equation (11):
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* ' * * *; ; ;i i i iG E E T G E a s B b b s B E kτ = = ′ =′ ′ ′=      (11)
The climate tax on fertilizer use is uniform, that is, the tax rate 
is the same over all land qualities. This tax fixes the private fertilizer 
intensity to the socially optimal level and at the same time ensures 
that the farmer chooses the socially preferable tillage method. The 
rest of the policy instruments are needed to establish the socially 
optimal land allocation. 
Equation (11) indicates that information requirements now 
extend up to soil emissions and soil carbon sequestration, as they 
are need to set the soil emissions tax and carbon sequestration 
subsidies at optimal level.We discuss next how the policy focus 
on climate damage versus water quality damage impacts policy 
design. Suppose first that water quality policies focus on the same 
measures as climate policies, then the society uses a Pigouvian tax 
on fertilizer and a lump sum tax on nutrient runoff from green set 
aside and afforestation. The Pigouvian fertilizer tax rate is defined 
by ( )* '. lD gτ ′= , and it is differentiated over soil types and 
qualities.
The features of fertilizer tax are well-established [1,13].
Whether the tax rate is uniform or differentiated by soil quality 
depends on the properties of nutrient runoff. If nutrient runoff 
is independent of soil quality, the optimal tax is uniform but it is 
differentiated if runoff properties differ between different qualities 
see [1]for general discussion on how heterogeneous land quality 
impacts differentiation of policy instruments). The lump sum 
nutrient runoff tax on green set-aside and afforestation reflects 
nutrient runoff from these land uses, which is very low relative 
to nutrient runoff from cultivated land. The nutrient runoff tax 
on afforestation is the average annual present value of the runoff 
damage (see [26] for nutrient runoff and design of forest-specific 
instruments to reduce nutrient runoff).
When the society addresses both externalities simultaneously, 
accounting for the co-benefits tends to increase the fertilizer tax but 
leaves the soil emission tax unchanged. Furthermore, it decreases 
the size of climate subsidy on green set-aside (due to minor constant 
runoff damage) and leaves the subsidy on afforestation unchanged 
(see Appendix). 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )** ' ' ** * ** ' ** *. ; ; . ;i i l lG E E D g T T s B b b D g s sτ = + = = −′ ′ =′ ′  (12).
The optimal fertilizer tax rate increases relative to climate 
policy only and is no longer uniform. Tax on soil emissions remain 
the same but the net subsidy for afforestation and green set-aside 
may be positive or negative depending on relative value of climate 
benefit from carbon sequestration and nutrient runoff damage. 
We examine empirically how much the inclusion of nutrient runoff 
damages would reinforce the impacts of climate policies, what is 
the relative role of land allocation versus productive inputs and 
how the instruments perform with respect to fiscal effects, that is, 
from government net tax revenue viewpoint.
Parametric Model
We now introduce the empirical counterpart of the theoretical 
model and employ it to examine the role of productive input and 
land allocation in reducing nutrient loads and GHG emissions. The 
model is calibrated to agricultural, economic and environmental 
data collected from Southern Finland. Spring barley (Hordeum 
vulgare) is selected as a representative crop, because it is the 
most common crop covering about half of the field parcels under 
crop cultivation [26] Table 1. The soil type under cultivation is 
assumed to be one of the three most common soil types; clay, loam 
and organic soil. Clay soils cover over half of the cropland area in 
Finland, organic about 14% and loam 35% [27]. 
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Table 1: Fertilizer intensity under private and social optima (kg/ha).
Soil Type Clay Loam Organic
Tillage method Conv. No-till Conv. No-till Conv. No-till
Min
0l private 126.2 123.6 120.3 118 122.8 120.5
∗
1l  social (runoff)
108.9 114.7 102.3 107.9 104.6 110.2
∗
2l  social (CO2 eq.)
116 113.4 110.1 107.8 112.6 110.3
∗
3l  social (CO2 eq & runoff)
100.6 105 95.2 99.6 97.5 102
Mean
0l private 133.1 130.8 127.5 125.1 130 127.6
∗
1l  social (runoff)
113.9 119.9 108.8 114.6 111.1 117
∗
2l  social (CO2 eq.)
122.9 120.6 117.3 114.9 119.8 117.4
∗
3l  social (CO2 eq & runoff)
107 111.8 101.8 106.4 104.1 108.8
Max
0l private 144.1 141.8 138.4 136.1 140.9 138.6
∗
1l  social (runoff)
123.1 129.6 118.6 124.9 120.9 127.2
∗
2l  social (CO2 eq.)
133.9 131.6 128.2 125.9 130.7 128.4
∗
3l  social (CO2 eq & runoff)
117 122.1 111.8 116.8 114.1 119.1
Crop cultivation
Farmers use a compound fertilizer that contains nitrogen 
and phosphorus in fixed proportions and target yield response to 
nitrogen application. Mitscherlich nitrogen response function is 
employed for spring barley.
( ) ( )( ); 1 exp expii i if l q m lσ ρ= − −       fori=1,2 (13)
where liis nitrogen application rate and m, σ and ρare 
parameters. Yields are usually slightly higher on conventionally 
tilled fields compared to no-till. Yields also depend on soil type:clay 
soils provide highest and loam soil lowest yields. As for soil 
qualities, the maximum yields are about 21% higher on high quality 
soil and about 11% lower on low quality soil compared to the mean 
yields. Appendix I, Table A1 collects the production parameters 
regarding Mitscherlich nitrogen response function and costs and 
prices related to barley production. 
Appendix I: Derivation of tax instruments
We derive optimal tax rates given the socially optimal solution 
in equations (9)-(10c). We levy the instruments on fertilizer 
application and soil emissions and derive conditions which lead to 
the social optimum. Farmer’s profits from crop production under 
the nitrogen tax τ targeting both climate emissions and nutrient 
runoff and soil emissions tax T are
TKlcqlpf t
tat −−+−= )();( τπ      A.1
In the presence of carbon subsidies, s, private profits from 
green set-aside and forestry, respectively, are given by,
)( G
GR zDsb ′−=π    A.2
RFskF −+=π     A.3
The farmer chooses fertilizer application, tillage method 
and land allocation between alternative land-use forms so as to 
maximize total profits from land:
[ ] dqqgLLL FGRat )(
1
0
321∫ ++=Π πππ            A.4
subject to 1321 =++ LLL , that this, the shares of land uses 
should equal unity.
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The first-order conditions governing the interior solution of the 
social optimum, where all land is allocated between the three uses, 
can be expressed as,
0)( =+− τcpf tl     A.5a
0);,( =−∗ GRtat qal ππ   A.5b
0=− FGR ππ     A.5c
As the system is recursive, the optimal emission tax on fertilizer 
application can be determined by setting conditions (10a) and A.5a 
equal and determining τ that produces the equality:




l    A.6
The optimal tax on the use of fertilizers:
t
lgDEEG )(')( ⋅+′′=τ  and if only climate impacts are 
accounted for the tax rate is EEG ′′= )(τ . Under this condition 
the private fertilizer intensity coincides with the socially optimal 
one. 
The tax on soil emissions can be solved by setting the private 
indirect profits equal to indirect social returns and solving for 
the tax, which gives saEGT )(
* ′= . This guarantees that all 
externalities are internalized and the private choice of cultivation 
technology coincides with the social choice. Comparing next the 
social returns to green set aside with the private one in a similar 
manner shows that they are identical by choosing the net subsidy 
rate as )()( GzDEBs ′−′= . This in turn guarantees that the 
private land allocation implements the socially optimal allocation.






Nitrogen response function for spring barley. 















Seeds (own and bought) K 45 45 €/ha/year
Herbicides. pesticides 36 51 €/ha/year
Machinery (tractor). use + fixed costs 44 + 193 15 + 143 €/ha/year
Harvesting* 75 75 €/ha/year
Labor** 23 0 €/kg/year
Price of barley p 0.17 0.17 €/kg/year
Price of nitrogen fertilizer c 1.3 1.3 €/kg/year
Climate damage Ø 0.02 0.02 €/kg/CO2
* Harvesting and crop drying are contracted out ** The difference between the technologies.
Greenhouse gas emissions
For greenhouse gas emissions under different fertilizer 
intensities we refer directly to the result Table 2 (for a general 
discussion on GHG emissions, see [3]. Emissions include both soil 
emissions and emissions from input use including nitrous oxide, 
carbon dioxide and methane fluxes from the whole life cycle of crop 
production, excluding the emissions from crop consumption. All 
the soil types are sources of nitrous oxide emissions while organic 
soils are also a substantial source of carbon dioxide. Methane fluxes 
are either very small or even negative [28,29]. 
Table 2: Greenhouse gas emissions under private and social optima (kg CO2 eq./ha/year).
Soil Type Clay Loam Organic
Tillage method Conv. till. No-till Conv. till. No-till Conv. till. No-till
Soil emissions 896 1154 1695 4723 11544 11407
7/17How to cite this article: Markku O . Climate and Water Quality Policy Design for Agriculture with Environmental Co-Benefits. Mod Concep Dev Agrono.3(1). 
MCDA.000552. 2018. DOI: 10.31031/MCDA.2018.03.000552
Mod Concep Dev Agrono
                   
  Copyright © Markku Ollikainen
Volume 3 - Issue - 1
Min
0E private
2184 2064 2096 1979 2131 2014
∗
1E  social (runoff)
1973 1955 1876 1856 2006 1989
∗
2E  social (CO2 eq.)
2060 1940 1971 1854 2007 1890
∗
3E  social (CO2  eq. & runoff)
1872 1836 1789 1755 1823 1789
Soil emissions 843 1100 1640 4668 11489 11352
Mean
0E private
2283 2166 2200 2083 2236 2119
∗
1E  social (runoff)
2049 2033 1972 1954 2006 1989
∗
2E  social (CO2  eq.)
2159 2042 2075 1958 2112 1995
∗
3E  social (CO2  eq. & runoff)
1964 1934 1886 1854 1921 1889
Soil emissions 760 1017 1557 4585 11406 11269
Max
0E private 2449 2330 2364 2246 2402 2283
∗
1E  social (runoff) 2194 2181 2122 2108 2157 2144
∗
2E  social (CO2 eq.)
2325 2206 2239 2121 2278 2159
∗
3E  social (CO2 eq. & runoff)
2118 2090 2039 2009 2074 2046
According to Finnish empirical studies, carbon dioxide 
emission fluxes from agricultural soils are either similar or even 
greater under no-till compared to conventional tillage see Table 2. 
Recently, empirical studies have shown that it is likely that no-till 
and conventional tillage do not differ in terms of their impact on 
soil net carbon content, but the carbon is accumulated to different 
parts of the soil layer keeping the net carbon balance more or less 
equal [30,31]. Afforestation and green fallow are both suggested 
to be good options to increase soil carbon. [32] have studied the 
carbon cycle during 80 years on an afforested land area on mineral 
soils and noted that the accumulation continues but at a decreasing 
rate to the end of the rotation. 
Figure 1: Carbon dioxide fluxes on mineral and organic afforested soils.
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Lohila et al.[33] examined 30 year old forest on organic soil 
that was previously under crop cultivation. Figure 1 describes the 
evolvement of carbon in mineral soils and organic soils drawing 
on[32,33]. To describe the beginning of the forest rotation on organic 
soil in Figure 1, we use data from bare fallow [34]. Emissions from 
a newly afforested land are considerably higher during the first 
years due to increased soil respiration on both mineral and organic 
soils [35]. However, for organic soils the beginning of the rotation 
period is often more difficult and the soil is bare or with only light 
vegetation for a longer period of time. We assume that the forest is 
cut at the end of the rotation (after 80 years) and again replanted. 
Forest management practices affect its carbon balance and to keep 
the carbon lost in minimum forest cutting and renewal practices 
should disturb soil as little as possible [35](Figure 1). 
More detailed information on GHG emissions from afforestation 
and green fallow are reported in Appendix I. Table A2. As noted, 
mineral soils are sinks of carbon in both land use options, while 
organic soils are either a source (green fallow) or a minor sink 
(afforested). To be able to account the damage (benefit) from 
climate emissions (carbon sequestration) we need to change 
the GHG fluxes into monetary values and for this we employ the 
estimate of marginal damage of carbon dioxide emissions 0.02€/
kg CO2 eq. This value is derived from the study by [36]on marginal 
damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions.





Constant b0 -0.7 -0.7
Constant b 0.7 0.7
Average runoff from fertilisation ϖ 15 7.5 kg/ha/year from 100kg N
Nitrogen fertilisation* Nt 95 - 126 99 - 142 kg/ha/year
Erosion ζ 800 250 kg/ha/year
Surface runoff Ψ 234 234 mm/ha/year
Soil phosphorus θ 10.6 10.6 mg/l/year
Phosphorus rate P 0.143 0.143 mg/l/year
Technology factor, PP α 2.4 3.7
Technology factor, DRP β 0.77 1.22
*Varies in terms of the soil type, quality and policy.
Nutrient runoff
We include both nitrogen and phosphorus runoff and in the 
case of phosphorus we account both dissolved reactive phosphorus 
(DRP) and particulate phosphorus (PP). Because in compound 
fertilizer (NPK) the three main nutrients are in fixed proportions, 
nitrogen fertilizer intensity determines also the amount of 
phosphorus used. Part of this phosphorus is taken up by the crop, 
while the rest accumulates and builds up soil P. The concentration 
of dissolved phosphorus in surface runoff depends linearly on 
the easily soluble soil P, and the runoff of particulate phosphorus 
depends on soil erosion and the P content of eroded soil material.
Drawing on Finnish field experiment studies we assume that 
1kg increase in soil phosphorus reserve increases the soil P status 
(i.e., ammonium acetate-extractable P) by 0.01mg/l soil. [37]
estimated the following linear equation between soil P and the 
concentration of dissolved phosphorus (DRP) in runoff: water 
solubleP in runoff (mg/l) = 0.021*soil_P (mg/l soil)-0.015 (mg/l). 
The surface runoff of potentially bioavailable particulate 
phosphorus is approximated from the rate of soil loss and the 
concentration of potentially bioavailable phosphorus in eroded soil 
material as follows: potentially bioavailable particulate phosphorus 
PP (mg/kg eroded soil) = 250* ln (soil_P (mg/l soil))-150 
[37]. Thus, the parametric description of surface phosphorus 
runoff is given by
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=   
            (15)
In equation (14) for particulate phosphorus, ζi is erosion rate 
(kg/ha), θ the amount of soil phosphorus (mg/l). Soil_P is fixed at 
10.6mg/l, which is the average for Finnish FADN farms situated in 
southern and south-western Finland Myyrä et al. [39].In equation 
(15) ψ is the amount of surface runoff (mm/ha). Piis in both 
equations the phosphorus application rate (kg/ha). Runoff and 
erosion differ within no-till and conventional tillage, but the amount 
of soil phosphorus is the same for both tillage methods. Tillage 
method specific factors, αi and βi, describe the distinctive characters 
of the no-till and conventional tillage,  and  . 
Parameters are given in Appendix I, Table A2. To express the social 
valuation of phosphorus runoff damages, phosphorus is changed 
into nitrogen equivalents using Redfield ratio 7.2, which describes 
the optimum N/P ratio for the growth of phytoplankton, relevant 
for algal growth in coastal waters Lankoski et al. [24]. 
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For nitrogen runoff we use [40] nitrogen runoff function 





lZ b bϖ  = +         (16)
Where ilZ  = nitrogen runoff at fertilizer intensity level li, kg/ha, 
=nitrogen runoff at average nitrogen application, 0 0b < and 1 0b >
are constants and il  = nitrogen fertilization in relation to the normal 
fertilizer intensity for the crop, 0.5 ≤N≤1.5. This runoff function 
represents nitrogen runoff generated by a nitrogen application rate 
of il  per hectare and the parameter  reflects differences in tillage 
methods.
Optimal Use of Inputs and Land Allocation
We now derive numerically the optimal policy design that 
requires first solving the private and social optima and based 
on those the policy instruments. We then examine the relative 
contribution of input choices and land allocation on nutrient runoff 
and GHG emissions.
Use of inputs, GHG emissions and nutrient runoff
We report the privately and socially optimal levels of nitrogen 
fertiliser application in Table 1. Given the complexity of our 
heterogeneous land quality model, the results are presented in 
combinations of soil types and qualities and for both cultivation 
technologies. We indicate the policy focus in parentheses.The 
difference between private and socially optimal fertilizer intensity 
depends on the policy focus on environmental impacts. If the focus 
is on nutrient runoff the difference is on average around 20kg/ha 
for conventional tillage and around 10kg/ha for no-till. 
When policy focuses on CO2 equivalent emissions the socially 
optimal nitrogen application intensity is about 10kg lower than 
privately optimal. Considering both GHG emissions and nutrient 
runoff further reduces socially optimal fertilizer applications. 
While no-till entails lower fertilizer intensity than conventional 
tillage when focus is only on GHG emissions, it has higher intensity 
when nutrient runoff damages are taken into account. The reason 
lies in the fact that no-till results in much lower nutrient runoff than 
conventional tillage.2
GHG emissions as a primary policy goal and as co-
benefits
Table 2 presents the GHG emissions from cultivation practices 
under different policy focuses. For all policies, we report CO2eq. 
emissions (CO2, N2O and CH4) from crop cultivation practices 
anddenote itby E. In a separate row we report the soil emissions 
under both technologies (for a closer description of data, see Ervola 
et al. [3]. Soil emissions differ greatly between soil types but only 
marginally between qualities. Soil emissions from organic soils are 
more than ten times higher than those from clay soils and several 
times of those from loam soils. Differences between technologies 
are minor relative to differences in soils. 
Soil emissions make almost 50% of all emissions on clay soils 
and over 50% on loam soils. In organic soils these emissions are five 
times higher than those from cultivation practices. These figures 
provide an important lesson: there is a need to develop new crop 
production systems (for instance, crop rotations based on legumes 
and perennial crops) that strengthen carbon sequestration and 
reduce soil emissions. The middle rows of Table 2 (runoff and 
CO2equivalent emissions) provide the cases for the analysis of 
co-benefits produced. With two exceptions on low quality soils, 
nutrient runoff policy results in GHG emissions that are smaller 
than those under climate policy only, since the socially optimal 
input use intensity is lower under the former policy. 
Thus, climate co-benefits from water quality policy are 
significant.Policy addressing both climate and water quality 
objectives results in the lowest GHG emissions as socially optimal 
input use intensities are further decreased. Finally, GHG emissions 
from cultivation practices are lower for no-till than conventional 
tillage due to lower use of fossil fuels.
Nitrogen runoff as a primary policy goal and as co-benefits





Rotation age T 25 80 years
Real interest rate r 3 3 Percent %
Carbon sequestration rate (depends on soil type) ϑ -4695 – 3240 4 -4538 kg CO2/ha/year
N2O 2.49 - 8.22 5 2.23 - 9.5 5 kg N2O/ha/year
CH4 -1.65 - 0.46 5 kg CH4/ha/year
GHG emissions from management 22 1 72 2 kg CO2 eq./year/ha
Net returns for afforested land R - 47.8 3 €/ha/year
Green fallow establishment costs z 34 - €/ha/year
2 To be more specific, no-till reduces considerably both nitrogen and particulate phosphorus runoff relative to conventional tillage. The well-known 
drawback is that no-till increases dissolved phosphorus runoff. Lankoski et al. (2006) find in their case that when the reduction of nitrogen and particulate 
phosphorus are taken into account and valued in monetary terms, benefits from their reductions outperform the costs of increases in dissolved phosphorus.
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Table 3 presents the nitrogen runoff (N) kg/ha (for nitrogen and 
phosphorus runoff expressed as nitrogen equivalents see Appendix 
I: Table A3). The nitrogen runoff is between 15 and 20kg/ha under 
conventional tillage and 7.5 to 10kg/ha under no-till. 
Table 3: Private optimum vs. alternative social optima: Nitrogen runoff from crop cultivation kg/ha/year.
Soil type Clay Loam Organic
Tillage method Conv. till. No-till Conv. till. No-till Conv. till. No-till
Min
0N private 18 8.8 17.3 8.5 17.6 8.7
∗
1N  social (runoff)
16 8.3 15.2 7.9 15.5 8.1
∗
2N  social (CO2 eq.)
16.8 8.2 16.1 7.9 16.4 8.1
∗
3N  social (CO2 eq. & runoff)
15.1 7.8 14.5 7.5 14.7 7.6
Mean
0N private 18.9 9.3 18.2 8.9 18.5 9.1
∗
1N  social (runoff)
16.5 8.6 16 8.3 16.2 8.4
∗
2N  social (CO2 eq.)
17.6 8.7 16.9 8.3 17.2 8.5
∗
3N  social (CO2 eq. & runoff)
15.8 8.1 15.2 7.8 15.4 8
Max
0N private 20.4 10 19.6 9.7 20 9.8
∗
1N  social (runoff)
17.6 9.2 17.1 8.9 17.4 9.1
∗
2N  social (CO2 eq.)
19 9.4 18.3 9 18.6 9.1
∗
3N  social (CO2 eq. & runoff)
16.9 8.8 16.3 8.4 16.6 8.6
These results show that in the case of no-till cultivation climate 
policy internalising CO2-eq damage also achieves socially optimal 
nitrogen runoff in almost all cases, while in the case of conventional 
tillage water quality objectives are only partially met with climate 
policy. Overall, however, climate policy results in significant water 
quality co-benefits. 
Deviation of water quality and GHG damages from the social optimum
Figure 2: Nitrogen application, nutrient runoff damage, GHG damage and social welfare under climate and water quality policies relative to 
a policy targeting both environmental externalities.
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Figure 2 illustrates how much a policy focusing only on GHG 
damage or nutrient runoff damage deviates from the first-best policy, 
which internalises both externalities. The first-best benchmark is 
represented by the 0% line in the figure and we report deviations 
in terms of nitrogen application, water quality and GHG damages 
and social welfare. If only nutrient runoff damage is internalised, 
then the divergence from the socially optimal benchmark is not 
very large. Nutrient runoff damage differs by 3% and GHG damage 
by 5%, and the social welfare estimate is only 1% lower than in the 
first-best solution that internalises both externalities. 
If policy targets only GHG damage, then the difference to the 
social optimum internalising both externalities is much larger 
especially regarding GHG damage (-18%) and social welfare (-26%). 
Thus, in terms of both runoff and GHG damage, water quality policy 
performs much better than climate policy.The deviation of the two 
second-best policies from the benchmark stem primarily from the 
use of nitrogen fertilizer, which remains at much higher level when 
the policy targets only GHG emissions but is only slightly higher 
than the benchmark when policy targets only nutrient runoff. 
The difference in nitrogen application, in turn, is created by 
the facts that valuation of water quality is much higher than that 
of GHG damage and that the relative role of nitrogen application 
causing nitrogen runoff is higher than its role with regard to GHG 
emissions. So, ultimately these outcomes are explained by both 
valuation estimates and properties of nitrogen runoff and GHG 
emissions functions.Results reported in Tables 1-3 determine the 
private profits and social returns to crop cultivation for all soil 
types and each land quality. Before reporting the respective land 
use choices, we examine how competitive long-term green set-
aside and afforestation are privately and socially in comparison to 
crop cultivation. 
Land allocation between crop production, green set-
aside and afforestation
Long-term green set-aside produces climate benefits by 
sequestering carbon back to arable soils. Afforestation does the 
same thing via tree growth but unlike green set-aside, it also means 
a reduction in the arable land area. Annual costs of green set-aside 
are quite modest, 34€/ha/year (including both the establishment 
and management costs). Afforested land produces harvest revenue 
but for the first rotation period the annualized present value of net 
returns is modest, about 48€/ha/year Ollikainen&Lankoski[41].
We report the carbon sequestration, private profits and the social 
returns for green set-aside and afforestation in Table 4.
Figures reported in Table 4 represent net impact, that is, carbon 
sequestered minus nitrous oxide emissions. Mineral soils (clay 
and loam) are an important sink of carbon and provide positive 
climate net benefits. For afforestation we bundled clay and loam 
soils together, as data is reported on mineral soils as an aggregate. 
Organic soils sequester carbon but only slightly and the nitrous 
oxide emissions exceed sequestration by a wide margin making the 
net emissions positive but definitely lower than under cultivation. 
The lower part of Table 4 shows that private profits from green set-
aside are negative (in the absence of support payments) and private 
revenue from afforestation is much lower than the social returns. 
Social returns to green set-aside are positive in loam soils but not 
in other soil types. 
Table 4: Carbon sequestration, private profits and social returns: afforestation and green fallow.
Afforestation* Green Set-Aside*
Mineral soils Organic soils Clay Loam Organic
CO2, kg/ha/year -5013 572 -1167 -4673 3262
CO2 eq., kg/ha/year -4357 3376 -234 -3920 5670
π0, €/ha 47.8 47.8 -34 -34 -34
Social returns (CO2 emissions), €/ha 145.1 57.1 -10.9 57.2 -96.9
Social returns (CO2 eq. emissions), €/ha 131.7 1.1 -29.6 42.1 -145.1
*Negative values indicate net carbon sequestration and positive values emission fluxes.
Privately and Socially Optimal Land Allocation
The privately and socially optimal land allocation between all 
three land-use forms is presented in Table 5. In crop production 
these returns reflect the most profitable cultivation technology. The 
details are allocated to Appendix I, Table A1. We report soil types 
and qualities used in crop production with the tillage method (no-
till or conventional tillage) and use acronym AF for afforestation. We 
denote social returns by W and report the figures in parentheses.
No-till cultivation is more profitable both privately and socially, 
than conventional tillage mainly due to lower production costs. 
The only exception to the choice of tillage method can be found on 
the highest quality loam soils, where conventional tillage is chosen 
instead of no-till for the case where policy focus is solely on CO2 
equivalents. Irrespective of soil types, soil qualities matter a lot. 
Under the social optima related to climate change (W2 and W3), the 
minimum and mean qualities in loam and organic soils are allocated 
to afforestation. Green set-aside turns out never be optimal due to 
its low carbon sequestration relative to forestry.
Relative impact of input use intensity versus land 
allocation
We next present our results in a form that facilitates the 
analysis of the role of input use intensity and land allocation. We 
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decompose the relative impacts of input use and land allocation as 
follows. The benchmark is the privately optimal use of inputs and 
land allocation reported in Tables 1&5 respectively. The benchmark 
contains also CO2-eq GHG emissions and nitrogen runoff under 
privately optimal solution, which are reported in Tables 2 & 3. We 
compare the privately optimal benchmark with Policy 3 (W3) that 
internalises both externalities. 
From Table 5 one can find out that there are five cases, where 
the optimal Policy 3 induces a change in land allocation, that is, a 
shift from the private optimum to the socially desired one.In all 
these cases land is allocated from no-till cultivation to afforestation. 
For these five cases Table 6 illustrates the relative impact of input 
use intensity versus land allocation in reducing nitrogen runoff and 
CO2-eq. GHG emissions. 
Table 5: The optimal land allocation based on private profits and social returns (€/ha/year).
Soil Type Clay Loam Organic
Min
Private profits NT (180) NT (120) NT (145)
W1 (runoff) NT (129) NT (52) NT (77)
W2 (CO2 eq.) NT (135) AF (132) AF (1)
W3 (CO2 eq. & runoff) AF (120) AF (120) AF (-10)
Mean
Private profits NT (267) NT (197) NT (227)
W1 (runoff) NT (196) NT (128) NT (157)
W2 (CO2 eq.) NT (203) AF (132) AF (1)
W3 (CO2 eq. & runoff) NT (135) AF (121) AF (-10)
Max
Private profits NT (424) NT (339) NT (375)
W1 (runoff) NT (340) NT (266) NT (302)
W2 (CO2 eq.) NT (348) CT (208) NT (105)
W3 (CO2 eq. & runoff) NT (277) NT (134) NT (35)
Table 6: Intensity effect versus land allocation effect in the reduction of nitrogen runoff and CO2-eq GHG emissions. 
Soil Type -Productivity
Intensity Effect, Kg/Ha Land Allocation Effect, Kg/Ha Intensity Effect, % Land Allocation Effect, %
N-runoff GHG N-runoff GHG N-runoff GHG N-runoff GHG
1. Case
(Clay-min)
-1.0 -228 -6.8 -7575 -11% -7% -77% -235%
2. Case (Loam-min) -1.0 -224 -6.5 -11059 -12% -3% -76% -165%
3. Case (Organic-min) -1.1 -225 -6.7 -10045 -13% -2% -77% -75%
4. Case (Loam-mean) -1.1 -229 -6.9 -11108 -12% -3% -78% -165%
5. Case (Organic-mean) -1.1 -230 -7.1 -10095 -12% -2% -78% -75%
The intensity effect is determined so that we compare GHG 
emissions and nitrogen runoff for no-till under the privately 
optimal solution and under Policy 3 (W3) without allowing for a 
change in land allocation. Thus intensity effect shows the impact 
of input use intensity on emissions and runoff between privately 
optimal solution and Policy 3 (W3). 
The land allocation effect is determined by the difference in 
GHG emissions and nitrogen runoff between privately optimal no-
till and socially optimal (Policy 3) afforestation that is, now we do 
not allow a shift to the socially optimal fertilizer intensity(Table 6). 
Results clearly demonstrate that land allocation effect is many 
times stronger than intensity effect. For nitrogen runoff, intensity 
effect results only in 11-13 % reduction while land allocation 
produces 77-78% of the reduction in nutrient runoff. For GHG 
emissions, the intensity effect produces 2-3% reduction and only 
in one case 7% reduction. The land allocation effect has impacts 
through soil carbon sequestration and emission reductions range 
from 75% to 235%.Hence, we conclude that reduction potential is 
very asymmetric, land allocation taking care of most.
Hence, we can conclude that the land allocation effect dominates 
the intensity effect, or to put it in terms of the theoretical model the 
extensive margin impact dominates the intensive margin impact. 
This finding has important implications for both climate and 
water quality policies. In the case of climate policy, the role of land 
allocation effect is especially strong on clay and loam soils, where 
its dominance is reinforced through soil carbon sequestration. 
As a result, land allocation change from cultivation (with no-till) 
to afforestation makes these soil types a sink of GHG emissions 
instead of source. 
Afforesting low productivity lands provides one important 
source for sinks and helps to promote Paris Climate Accord. Given 
that inputs and land allocation have such an asymmetric impacts 
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on the environment; it is also interesting to ask if this asymmetry 
translates to the fiscal properties of tax/subsidy instruments. This 
will be discussed in the next section.
Policy Instrument Design for Climate and Water Quality 
Objectives
Optimal policy instruments
We next determine the set of Pigouvian policy instruments 
that internalize climate and water quality damages resulting from 
private solution. The instrument set must induce the private farmers 
to choose optimally fertilizer intensity and tillage method over all 
soil types and qualities, and to allocate land optimally between 
crop production and carbon sequestration. We also estimate the 
fiscal impacts of the suggested set of taxes and subsidies. Given that 
many policy instruments are differentiated, we make an additional 
analysis to see, how much accounting for policy related transaction 
costs would impact the fiscal properties of the system.
Table 7: Optimal fertilizer tax rate (€/kg N and %).
Soil Type Clay Loam Organic

































































































































We start with the Pigouvian tax on fertilizer and report in Table 
7 the optimal tax rates for both tillage methods over the soil types 
and qualities. We denote the tax rate by τ. It is expressed in terms of 
€/kg and parentheses provide its percent value relative to fertilizer 
price.If only CO2 equivalent emissions are accounted for, the optimal 
tax is a uniform 24 cents per kg of nitrogen fertilizer over all soil 
types, qualities and tillage methods. If only water quality damage is 
internalised, then the optimal tax rate is doubled for conventional 
tillage but for no-till the difference to CO2 equivalent tax is very 
small. The optimal tax rates increase when both climate and water 
quality damages are internalised simultaneously. Note however, 
that the increase is less than the sum of tax rate under separate 
policies showing that there are synergies between both targets. 
In this case the optimal tax rates increase up to 75 cents/kg 
N (58%) for conventional tillage and 51 cents (39%) for no-till. 
Tax rates differ between soil types, qualities and tillage methods. 
Internalisation of water quality damage only leads to tax rates that 
are non-uniform and vary between soil types, qualities and tillage 
methods.The tax rates are lower for no-till, because no-till entails 
significantly lower nutrient runoff than conventional tillage. We 
next focus on the tax on soil emissions related to tillage methods 
(which were reported in Table 2). 
The optimal soil emissions tax is a lump sum tax, which is 
obtained by multiplying the amount of (fixed) soil emissions with 
the marginal damage from climate emissions, that is 0.02€/kg CO2 
eq. Recall, the soil emissions range from 760kg CO2eq./ha/year in 
clay soils to 11544kg CO2 eq./ha/year in organic soils. Thus, this 
tax would hit most severely organic soils: tax would be € 230.9/
ha in organic soils but only €15.2/ha in clay soils. Thus, the tax on 
organic soils is really significant when compared to the profitability 
of cultivation in organic soils (see private profits of cultivation in 
Annex Table A1).
Finally, a consistent policy mix must entail a net subsidy on 
green set-aside and afforestation as alternative carbon sequestering 
land use options. This subsidy covers the net climate benefits from 
green set-aside and afforestation and depends on soil type, as well 
as, whether CO2 or CO2eq. emissions are accounted for. We report 
the tax/subsidy rates in Table 8. Figures with minus sign denote 
subsidies and those without it are taxes. For afforestation we have 
combined clay and loam soils together as mineral soils, because 
GHG measurement in forestry does not separate between them.
Table 8: Tax-subsidy payments on green set-aside and 
afforestation, €/ha/year.
Agricultural Soils: Green Set-Aside
CO2 eq. net emissions
Clay Loam Organic soils
-4.4 -76.1 111.1
Forest soils




Starting with green set-aside, organic soils continue to be a 
source of GHG emissions, and consequently they are taxed. Despite 
this fact, tax creates incentives for land-use. To see this, just note 
that while the tax on soil emissions in cultivated land was 231 euros, 
it is now less than half of it. Green set-side is subsidized in clay and 
loam soils and for loam soils subsidies are rather high, close to 100 
euros/ha. Actually, green set-aside in loam competes very well with 
afforestation in mineral soils. Interestingly, organic soils turn out to 
be a challenge for afforestation, too, and when CO2eq. emissions are 
accounted for, they are subject to taxation instead of subsidization. 
Using this set of three policy instruments establishes the social 
optimum through the choices of private farmers. We provided the 
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proof for this assertion in the theoretical part and the proof by our 
numerical calculation is shown in Appendix I, Table A1. This table 
shows that the choices concerning fertilizer use, tillage method and 
land allocation are identical over soil types and qualities. 
Fiscal effects of policy designs with co-benefits
We finally provide estimates on the fiscal effects of the 
socially optimal policy and the two second-best policies defined 
by equations (11) and (12). We calculate the impacts of optimal 
instruments on the government net revenue, while also considering 
public sector transaction costs (administrative costs) for different 
policy designs. For this purpose, we multiply the per hectare tax or 
subsidy payments by the respective shares of total arable land area 
in each land quality in Finland. The total crop production area in 
2009 was about 1.2 million hectares. This land area is distributed 
between soil types and qualities as follows: clay soils contain 51% 
of the land area, loam 35% and organic soils 14%. The best qualities 
in each soil type are assumed to cover 25%, mean qualities 50% 
and low qualities 25%.
Public sector transaction costs for design, implementation, 
monitoring and enforcement may differ greatly between different 
policies and thus affect the overall social welfare effects as well as 
fiscal aspects of the given policy instrument. The policy-related 
transaction costs (PRTCs) belong to the class of institutional 
transaction costs. Accounting for PRTCs is important for several 
reasons: 
a) It improves comparison among and screening of 
alternative policy instruments, 
b) It can help the effective design and implementation of 
policy instruments to achieve policy objectives, 
c) It improves the evaluation of policy instruments, and 
d) It helps track budgetary costs of policy instruments over 
their whole life cycle McCann et al. [42]. Despite the importance 
of PRTCs for policy choice, PRTCs have seldom been formally 
included in environmental policy making OECD [43]. Moreover, 
there are only a few studies that provide empirical estimates of 
PRTCs of environmental policy instruments. 
Here we follow Ollikainen [2] who assess policy-related 
transaction costs associated with the main agricultural and agri-
environmental policy instruments in Finland. On the basis of this 
study we estimated the following public sector transaction costs for 
the policy instruments (as a share of total payment transfer or tax 
revenue): 
(i) Uniform fertilizer tax 9.4%, 
(ii) Differentiated fertilizer tax 27.3%, 
(iii) Soil emissions tax 17.5%, and 
(iv) Subsidy for afforestation and green set-aside 9.4%. 
We use these figures to provide transaction costs adjusted 
government tax revenues. 
Table 9: Tax revenues from the socially optimal land allocation 1 000 000 €/year.
Clay
(51% of field parcels)
Loam
(35% of field parcels)
Organic
(14% of field parcels)































W1 8.24 xx 10.9 xx 4.55 xx 23.69 21.44
W2 4.21 4.97 -8.83 2.01 2.37 1.74
W3 -10.73 -7.42 2.57 -15.58 -17.05
Mean
W1 9.51 xx 6.03 xx 2.62 xx 18.16 13.2
W2 8.96 9.63 -17.65 4.02 4.95 4.81
W3 16.75 9.63 -14.84 5.15 16.69 11.35
Max
W1 5.53 xx 3.55 xx 1.48 xx 10.56 7.68
W2 4.89 4.58 3.35 4.47 1.34 10.11 28.74 24.49
W3 9.49 4.58 6.15 10.67 2.58 10.11 43.58 34.18
W1 = Water quality policy, 
W2 = Climate policy, and 
W3 = Climate and water policy combined.
Note: Soil qualities are allocated to min 25%, mean 50% and max 25%. Minus sign indicates net subsidy for afforestation. 
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Table 9 collects the tax revenues and subsidy payments and 
sums up the net revenue on each policy scheme. It demonstrates 
how complex the sources for government tax revenue can be: soil 
qualities, soil types and land allocation provide a variable tax base 
that is a function of the tax rates-a feature not quite often present 
in ordinary tax policy.
Starting with minimum soil qualities and water quality policy 
1 (W1) all soil types are cultivated with no-till and total fertilizer 
tax revenue is 23.7M€. Since water quality policy is implemented 
through differentiated fertilizer tax, which entails relatively high 
PRTCs, the net tax revenue adjusted with PRTCs is 21.4M€. Note that 
policy 1 does not entail soil emission tax (denoted by xx in Table 6). 
Climate policy (W2) collects tax revenue of about 9 million euros (as 
a sum of the fertilizer tax and tax on soil emissions) from clay soils 
while loam soils receive net subsidy for afforestation and organic 
soils pay net tax[44-47]. Overall climate policy results in slightly 
positive net tax revenue. If water quality aspects are included (W3), 
the land is shifted to afforestation for which the subsidy payments 
are about 16M€ euros per year.
In the mean land quality, all clay soils are under cultivation 
but loam and organic soils are allocated to afforestation when 
climate policy belongs to the policy package. In these qualities, all 
policies bring more tax revenues than provide subsidy payments 
but the range is large starting from five million euros and raising 
up to 18 million euros. Finally, all best quality lands are allocated 
to cultivation, so that they bring tax revenue only[48-50]. Even 
though taxes are quite high on the best quality lands, cultivation is 
so profitable that taxation does not thread its profitability. 
The last column of the Table 9 reports government net tax 
revenues that are adjusted to reflect public sector transaction costs 
related to different policy instruments. Results show that when 
differentiated fertilizer tax is part of the policy (W1 and W3) then 
consideration of PRTCs significantly reduces net tax revenue from a 
given policy scenario, while in the case of uniform fertilizer tax (W2) 
this reduction is clearly lower. Table 10 sums up net tax revenues of 
each policy over the soil types and qualities and results in aggregate 
net tax revenues per year.
Table 10 shows that net tax revenues differ depending on the 
scope of policy. If transaction costs are omitted the lowest net 
tax revenue results from climate policy, because nutrient runoff 
damage tax is not collected and there are subsidy payments for 
afforestation. Water quality policy brings tax revenues from 
cultivated land and there are no subsidy payments for afforestation 
and thus this policy results in the highest net tax revenue[51]. The 
second highest net tax revenue is raised when both climate and 
water quality are addressed. 
Table 10: Aggregate net tax revenue under each policy scenario.
Policy design Net tax revenue, M€ Net tax revenue adjusted with PRTCs, M€
W1 Water quality policy 52.4 42.3
W2 Climate policy 36.1 31.0
W3 Climate policy and water quality policy combined 44.7 28.5
Consideration of PRTCs changes the net tax revenue ranking of 
policies (last column of Table 10). Now climate policy (W2) results 
in the second highest net tax revenues, while combined policy (W3) 
results in the lowest net tax revenues. Policies targeting water 
quality have relatively strong reduction in the net tax revenue due 
to the requirement to implement differentiated fertilizer tax that 
entails relatively high PRTCs.
Conclusion
Many agri-environmental practices, such as reduced fertilizer 
use or establishment of green set-asides, may have simultaneous 
positive effects on multiple environmental goods. If these 
environmental co-benefits are large, then they increase the social 
benefit of a given policy instrument. We focused on water quality 
and GHG emissions and examined how climate and water quality 
policy instruments affect both their primary target emission and 
co-benefit emissions. We showed that if only water quality damage 
is internalised then the divergence from social optimum where 
both damages are internalised is not very large, while if only GHG 
emissions damage is internalised then the difference to the social 
optimum internalising both externalities is much larger[52]. 
Thus, climate co-benefits from water quality policy are significant. 
Consequently, a coordinated policy design for water quality and 
climate policy is warranted in order to improve economic efficiency 
of government policy interventions.
If the change in nutrient runoff and GHG emissions is 
decomposed to input use and land allocation effects, changes in the 
land use have a much stronger effect on reducing water quality and 
GHG emission damages than changes in input use. This suggests that 
the extensive margin impact (land allocation) dominates intensive 
margin impact (intensity of input use). This has implications for 
policies, as discussed later. Does the asymmetry between input 
and land allocation effects translate to fiscal properties of policy 
instruments if policy-related transactions costs (PRTCs) are taken 
into account? Policy scenario focusing on water quality results in 
the highest net tax revenues, because it does not include subsidies 
(unlike climate policies). 
Accounting for PRTCs reduces considerably net tax revenue and 
changes the ranking of policies. This reveals the obvious trade-off 
between precision (differentiated taxations) and transaction costs. 
Transaction costs are lower for land-use based measures, which is 
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easy to monitor. This is an argument for the use of simpler second-
best instruments.Our analysis has important bearing for designing 
second-best policies. Consider, for instance, the implementation of 
the Paris Climate Accord and France’s 4‰ initiative. 
Our analysis suggests that allocating low quality lands to carbon 
sequestration will promote most efficiently climate mitigation 
with lots of water quality co-benefits. Moreover, observable land 
use based measures, such as green set-aside or afforestation, are 
much easier to enforce (compliance monitoring and verification) 
than input use measures, such as reduced fertiliser application. 
The challenge in land-use changing policy instruments is the 
fiscal burdenss. This challenge can be reduced by linking actions 
for carbon sequestration to emerging mechanisms of carbon 
compensations and carbon neutrality. 
Equally interesting implication is that if governments run only 
water or climate policy, the deviation from the first-best is smaller 
for water policy. This should be kept in mind in the preparation 
of new Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform. The reform 
will expectedly give more role for climate targets, and this is of 
utmost importance. But this should not lead to abandoning water 
quality policy targets. Therefore, climate policies should promote 
those measures that also promote water quality improvements. 
Coherence between climate and water quality targets must be kept 
in mind.
All in all, there is still much to do on the way towards climate-
smart agriculture that is managed in coherence with water quality 
targets.
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